By the 1990s, as African cities continued to grow at a pace that considerably exceeded the average for most other parts of the world, two central challenges were posed. The first was the challenge of more effectively managing urban services, so that (a) a minimum of efficiency could be assured for the continued functioning of the urban economy; and (b) the increasing numbers of urban poor would have access to clean water, health centres, education, public transport and other elements of public infrastructure. The second challenge, which in many ways subsumed the first, was to develop governance systems which provided access to local decisions by important groups in the community, while at the same time maintaining an institutional framework that was both legitimate in national terms, and more appropriate to the nature of modern urban life. This section will focus on the question of governance structures, although the technical functions of actually managing African cities can never be far from view.

There are important differences in the form of decentralization between francophone and anglophone countries which partially relate to their different colonial legacies. One of the most important components of local governance in Africa has been the colonial legacy of institutional structure. Britain and France, as the major colonial powers on the continent from the late 19th century to the 1960s, provided the basic framework for two, largely parallel approaches to local government. These two approaches overlapped to some degree by the 1990s, but their essential elements could still be distinguished. The pattern most common in Francophone countries can be called the communal structure, while the pattern in Anglophone countries may be called the representative council structure. The differences between the two are largely explained by history and the accretion of many decades of legal and administrative precedent.

Most of the Francophone countries in Africa (with the major exception of Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi, which were Belgian colonies) are former French colonies. Since the early part of the 20th century, urban government has been structured according to the French law dating back to 1884, which provides for communes with mayors, municipal councils, and specific revenue and expenditure powers and procedures. The level of responsibility over finances and local decisions typically depends on the size and wealth of a "commune", although the local authority has generally been considered to be an organizational modality internal to the unitary state. By the end of the colonial period in the late 1950s, the evolution of municipal institutions was such that the municipal councils (the administrative organs of the communes) in the larger cities had become responsible for a relatively important range of local services, and were presided over by elected mayors. For example, Abidjan, the capital of Côte d'Ivoire, was declared a "full exercise commune" (the highest legal category) in 1955, electing a full council by universal suffrage in 1956. Prefects were appointed for another six major communes, replacing elected mayors. While a relatively wide range of functions were discharged by the communes and the larger "City of Abidjan" (consisting of the central area of Abidjan and some adjoining communes), decisions on their implementation were taken by central government officials. This structure remained in place until 1980. There was a somewhat similar situation in Dakar, the capital of Senegal, with much deeper historical roots. Dakar was then the largest French-speaking city in West Africa. From 1887, when Dakar (which had earlier been designated, along with three other towns, as a "full exercise commune" under French law) was given French-style institutions. The city had an elected council, an elected mayor, and considerable influence over finance, services, and the hiring of personnel. By the early 1980s, however, the administration of the commune of Dakar was "exclusively carried out by centrally appointed officials, which has led, as a consequence, to the setting aside of any direct participation by elected elements."

By the 1980s, the balance between central and local government began to change. Not only was there more attention placed on the development of metropolitan government structures, but a more democratic and decentralized framework began to take shape. By the end of the decade, several countries (such as Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Bénin) were organizing regular, even multi-party elections both at the local and national level, and a number of other countries were clearly moving towards multi-party democracy. Thus, Senegal, which began multi-party elections in the late 1970s, established in 1983 the Urban Community of Dakar, which created a working arrangement to incorporate the three newly-created communes of Dakar, Pikine and Rufisque-Bargny. While the individual communes were governed by municipal councils selected both by selection (as representing interest groups) and open elections, their mayors were selected by secret ballot of their council.

By the 1980s, the balance between central and local government began to change in Francophone Africa. Not only was there more attention placed on the development of metropolitan government structures, but a more democratic and decentralized framework began to take shape. By the end of the decade, many countries (such as Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Bénin) were organizing regular, even multi-party elections both at the local and national level, and a number of other countries were clearly moving towards multi-party democracy. Thus, Senegal, which began multi-party elections in the late 1970s, established in 1983 the Urban Community of Dakar, which created a working arrangement to incorporate the three newly-created communes of Dakar, Pikine and Rufisque-Bargny. While the individual communes were governed by municipal councils selected both by selection (as representing interest groups) and open elections, their mayors were selected by secret ballot of their council. The mayor of the CUD (Dakar Urban Community) was likewise elected by secret ballot of the delegates of the communes to the 10-person governing body of the CUD. From 1983 until the present, the Mayor of the CUD has been the same individual, a high-profile politician with previous central government ministerial experience. As a leading member of an opposition party, representing the indigenous Lébou community, and having been able to assemble around him an impressive group of dedicated young technocrats, the mayor of Dakar has become:

Aside from the political dynamics within which it operates, the CUD is also important because of its important functions. These include construction and maintenance of roads within its jurisdiction, cleaning and sweeping of streets, removal and destruction of household wastes, management of the municipal hospital, management of municipal abattoirs, management of both Christian and Muslim cemeteries, and a number of other functions which include the overall direction of technical services at the local level.

Of all the decentralization exercises to have been initiated in Francophone Africa, the most thoroughgoing, and by many measures, effective has been that of the Côte d'Ivoire. The initiative began in late December, 1977, when a law was passed in the National Assembly confirming the establishment of the 2 existing "full exercise" communes (Abidjan and Bouaké). A series of laws defined the powers and institutions of the new communes, elaborating a specific regime under which they would be controlled by the central government. 10 communes were created within the former single commune of Abidjan, presided over by the City of Abidjan, whose structure and powers were specified. The Mayor of the City of Abidjan was to be elected from among their number by the elected mayors of the 10 component communes of the greater Abidjan area. Finally, in 1985, 98 new communes were added to the list of local authorities, for a total of 135, plus the City of Abidjan. According to most observers, the decentralization exercise in Côte d'Ivoire has on balance been a positive experience. On the one hand, more explicit transfers of powers need to be effected between the central and local authorities, and more resources need to be given to the communes in the form of personnel and taxation powers for them to manage their own affairs. But on the other hand, the role of the communes "in people's daily lives" is becoming increasingly evident. Functions such as maintaining the civil registry, public security, building and maintaining schools, maintaining urban roads, building and maintaining markets, removing household waste, and regulating abattoirs and public water taps are all within their jurisdiction. In addition, their elected mayors have often become very proactive, using, "as best they can, their networks of personal friends and supporters, as well as the bureaucracy and the party in power to mobilize support. They also attempt to obtain additional resources for their new responsibilities from foreign embassies and international NGOs." Partly as a result, "[t]oday, at the local level, the people speak first to the commune, thus pushing aside the role of the central administration to the non-communalized [i.e. rural] parts of the country."

In English-speaking African countries, the centralist legacy of the colonial period was more ambiguous. Historically, the United Kingdom has placed more emphasis than has France on democratically elected local councils for the administration and finance of a very wide range of local services. Towards the end of the colonial period, there was a strong thrust to introduce an "efficient and democratic system of local government" all over English-speaking Africa. By the 1960s, local councils proved unable to cope with burgeoning demands for improved education, health, and other local services. These shortcomings were particularly acute in the large, rapidly growing cities. And their inability to raise financing, in conjunction with central government restrictions on transfers, meant that their performance fell far short of their responsibilities. Partly as a result of both political and financial factors, in most English-speaking countries the political autonomy and fiscal resource base of municipal governments was progressively restricted during the 1960s and 1970s. Important exceptions were Nigeria, where for complex political reasons, military governments were favourable to local governments; and Zimbabwe which (after independence in 1980) opted to support local government as a major element in its development strategy.

A number of significant decentralization schemes were introduced during the 1970s, beginning with the exercise undertaken by President Nyerere in Tanzania in 1972, followed by the Nigerian initiative begun by the military regime in 1975 and continued through the return to civilian rule in 1979, and finalized by the sweeping introduction in Sudan of regional governments in both the south (in 1972), and in the north (in 1980). The Tanzanian initiative, as many commentators observed, was little more than the deconcentration of central government functionaries to the regional and district level, where democratically elected local councils were abolished, to be replaced by committees dominated by officials. As for the Sudanese initiative, there was little commitment from central officials to work at the regional level, and ultimately conflicts between the north and the south prevented a decentralized system from functioning. The Nigerian reforms resulted in the 1976 Local Government Act, which established a uniform pattern of local government in the whole of the country. Elections followed for local councillors at the end of 1976, and by the end of the military regime, there were some 299 local governments established all over Nigeria. What distinguished this reform was "the formal and unequivocal recognition of local government as constituting a distinct level of government with defined boundaries, clearly stated functions and provisions for ensuring adequate human and financial resources." The Revenue Allocation Act of 1981 guaranteed that established local governments were to receive 10% of the funds which the states received from the federal government, even though this requirement was honoured more in the breach than the observance. Nigerian local government has gone through many difficulties since the 1970s, but the reforms themselves are generally considered positive, "even though the gains have been complicated by other factors."

If the decentralization reforms of the 1970s were initiated by highly centralized governments, with little involvement of local communities and other groups in civil society, the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s have involved more give and take between government and other forces in the wider society. That this relationship has involved a struggle is evident in the case of Nairobi, the capital of Kenya. With a population of 1,346,000 in 1989, Nairobi is by far the largest, and most economically important centre in the country. Since the 1920s the city was governed by an elected municipal council and mayor. In March, 1983, the Minister for Local Government called a press conference to announce that the central government had suspended all meetings of the Nairobi City Council, and that it further had decided "to exclude indefinitely with immediate effect the mayor, the deputy mayor and all councillors from council premises". Several weeks later, citing "gross mismanagement of council funds and poor services to the residents", the minister placed Nairobi's approximately 17,000 municipal employees and all buildings and services under the direct control of a commission, which he himself appointed. Although the original intention of the commission had been to "clean up" the council and re-establish elected local government, the central government passed various motions through the National Assembly extending the life of the commission until both national and local elections were held in December, 1992. There was little evidence that the Commission was any more effective in managing the city's services than was the City Council before it. By 1991 a lengthy article in The Weekly Review (not considered a "sensationalist" publication) entitled "Filthy, Ailing City in the Sun" concluded

Kenya's first multiparty elections, held in December 1992, ushered in a new chapter in the turbulent history of Nairobi -- and of urban local governance in Kenya. One of the major new parties specifically called in its election manifesto for the granting of increased autonomy to local government. As has always been the case in Kenya, local and national elections were held at the same time. But whereas the governing party, KANU, had always captured both levels of seats in the urban wards and constituencies in the past, in this election the opposition parties won most of the parliamentary seats in the major urban areas, and took control of twenty-three of the twenty-six municipal councils, including Nairobi. The new mayor of Nairobi (elected by the sitting councillors) was himself not a member of the governing party of the country. Political differences between the central government and the newly elected municipal councils soon came to the surface, with the Minister of Local Government issuing a series of directives that curtailed the powers of the mayors. For the government, these councils were a political force to be reckoned with; but for the emerging middle class, the councils were a vehicle by which to achieve a greater measure of local autonomy.

By the 1990s, issues of urban governance in Africa were being seriously considered in the development agenda, both by many national governments, but increasingly by the multilateral and bilateral assistance agencies that supported development projects across the continent. Three major factors were at play in this process. In the first place, as African governments were obliged to accept structural adjustment "packages" involving cuts in the public service and more limited regulatory powers for the central government, local services could only be assured through some kind of coalition between local communities and their local governments. The logic of decentralization was reinforced by the argument that the most likely source of future funding for infrastructure and services would have to come from local, rather than national government. A second factor was undoubtedly the great interest of the donors -- particularly the French government, USAID, and the World Bank -- in decentralization as a strategy of development. These agencies came to a new awareness of the economic importance of urban development, just as the problems of governing African cities demonstrated that the institutional aspects of development were the most recondite. Finally, a slow process of democratization and the emergence of self-conscious groups in civil society could also be discerned. The most spectacular example of this trend was South Africa, which gained a democratic government in 1994 following a major struggle in which "civic" organizations in the black urban townships played a major role. But elsewhere in Africa, as the formerly "statist" and highly centralized governments grew weaker under the twin assaults of globalization and structural adjustment, local communities and interest groups in the cities began to assert themselves both in the democratic election process, and in the day to day management of their communities.