The new political geography of the former Soviet Union and of what was previously called "East Europe" suggests the need to no longer discuss this as one region. For instance, the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) that were formerly part of the Soviet Union are, geographically, part of Northern Europe and best grouped with near neighbours such as Finland and Sweden. Most East European countries and the former Soviet republics that are on their western borders might more appropriately be discussed as one region, since they share many demographic, economic and spatial characteristics. There is certainly a need to consider urban change in countries such as Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Poland within a broader European context as their major cities strengthen linkages with the German and Austrian urban systems - or rather renew such linkages since many of their major cities developed on the basis of their interactions with cities such as Vienna and Berlin. The four republics in Central Asia also share demographic, economic and spatial characteristics that suggest that these be considered as one group and, geographically, part of Asia.

However, if the interest is in population and urban change since 1980, the countries that were until recently considered as "Eastern Europe" and the republics that were previously "the Soviet Union" have to be considered together. Their economic systems and political structures had important characteristics in common - that were also distinct from those in the rest of Europe - and these were the major influence on population and urban change. Until 1989, they were demarcated from the rest of Europe by the so called "Iron Curtain" and were subject to political and military control by the government of the Soviet Union. The whole region had a supra-national economic organization - the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance - and there were controls on population flows and trade with the West, although of varying strength, depending on the country and the decade. This brought major changes in their settlements, especially for cities and regions whose economies had previously developed through trading links with the West. This is why most of this section concentrates on East Europe as a group and on the former Soviet Union. Where possible, distinctions are drawn between the different republics in the former Soviet Union and between the countries formed by the break-up of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The only exception is the former East Germany that is considered within the section on West Europe. At the end of this section, some consideration is given to developments in the 1990s and what these may imply for population and urban change in the future.

Until the end of the 1980s, this varied group of 26 or more independent nations had economic and political characteristics quite distinct from those in West Europe that affected their settlement system and form that their cities took. These include government decisions rather than market forces determining the nature and location of most productive investment. In general, priority was given to industry over services and in many instances, industries were located outside the major cities in places that differed from what a market economy would have produced. Industries were also kept in operation long after they would have been deemed unprofitable or too expensive in the West so at least up until the economic and political changes of the late 1980s, most industrial centres had not undergone the very rapid falls in industrial employment that had affected so many industrial centres in Europe. The abolition of a land market in cities, the limited role permitted to a private housing market and private enterprises and the large scale housing estates built by public enterprises brought a very different logic to the form and spatial distribution of residential areas and enterprises within cities.

The political revolutions of 1989 brought not only an abrupt change in economic and political organization but also the break-up of Yugoslavia, the division of Czechoslovakia into two Republics and the reunification of Germany. These combined with the ethnic conflicts and civil wars and the radical changes in economic policy are also likely to have set in motion new trends in population and urban change that are not revealed by existing statistics and will have to wait for a new round of censuses. This section will concentrate on population and urban change in the region from 1950 to 1992.

By 1992, the population in East Europe had reached 124 million with 56 percent in urban areas. Half the total and the urban population was concentrated in Poland and Romania. This region had experienced the most rapid growth in total population and in urban population of any region in Europe - although in comparison to most of the world's regions, the scale of change was slow. The average for the region hides large differences - for instance, the slowest was in Hungary where population grew by only 11 percent in this 42 year period while the two fastest were Poland (55 percent) and Albania where the population nearly tripled.

Population density in the region lies between the higher densities found in West Europe and the lower densities of the Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The areas of high population density are generally around national capitals or the industrial and urban concentrations that often contain major metropolitan centres and these have gained from marked rural to urban migration since World War 2.

In Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, the high concentration of national population in and around the national capital is particularly notable. In 1990, 40 percent of Bulgaria's population was concentrated in the south-west of the country with Sofia, its surrounding region and the neighbouring region of Plovdiv. In Hungary, a fifth of the national population was in Budapest with another 10 percent in the surrounding county of Pest. In Romania, Bucharest and the south-east region of the country had almost 40 percent of the national population in the early 1990s. The national capitals in the Czech and Slovak republics, Albania and Poland concentrate far lower proportions of their national populations.

____________________________________________________

In addition to the main urban centres and industrial agglomerations, there are also large areas of high population density, mostly in the southern states that correspond to industrial concentrations in small urban centres and denser rural tracts - for example of Croatia, north of Zagreb, in Serbia in the Morava valley and in Kosovo, in Romania in Wallachia, in Albania along the coastal plain and in the Maritsa valley in Bulgaria.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: Population growth has slowed significantly over the last two decades; current estimates suggest an average annual growth rate of 1 percent a year. Birth rates have fallen rapidly while death rates also fell until 1980, after which small increases were recorded. Over the last decade, rates of natural increase have been high in comparison to West Europe, especially in Poland, the former Yugoslavia and Romania. However, by the early 1990s, in several cases, rates of natural increase were very slow; in Bulgeria, birth and death rates were close to cancelling each other out. In Hungary, deaths already exceeded births in 1990. For Romania, some predictions suggest that the population will fall by a quarter over the next two decades as birth rates fall well below death rates.

Although it is difficult to compare age structures within East Europe because there is no agreed definition for the working population, countries such as Albania and Poland have a high proportion of children, reflecting religious and political policies in these states. There are considerable variations in the proportion of the "aged" population. The smallest proportion are found in Albania with less than 10 percent and the former Yugoslavia with 13 percent - both probably attributable to poorer medical facilities. The highest proportions are found in Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak republics where the "aged" population represent a fifth or more of total population. Overall, the age structure of the region over the next decade is likely to show a decreasing proportion of children and an increasing proportion of people aged over 64.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: The removal of controls on people's movements and the greater possibilities of moving away from the region also brought changes in the settlement system. Prior to the changes in the late 1980s, the movement of people was regulated through registration formalities that allowed migration to be encouraged or discouraged in line with government priorities. In general, until the post-1989 changes, migration in Eastern Europe was only inter-regional within countries - apart from anomalies such as the repatriation of certain ethnic minorities or those people on temporary industrial and cultural appointments. There was a steady flow of migrants to the west, sometimes involving significant numbers after such political upheavals as occurred in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1980/81) but in general, international migration out of the region was controlled. One exception was Yugoslavia and estimates for 1988 suggest that there were 870,000 Yugoslav economic migrants working abroad.

International migration increased after 1989. Economic adversity - often associated with transformations of economic policies - and re-emerging ethnic and nationalist tensions caused large scale movements within and out of the region. At present, the former Yugoslavia is the main source of such movement as the former federation's disintegration has resulted in a long and bitter civil war. Recent UN estimates suggest around 1.8 million displaced persons within the former Yugoslavia and over half a million refugees from outside the territory. The split between the Czech and Slovak Republics could also lead to large-scale population movement, especially within the half million strong Hungarian minority in the new Slovakian state. The second reason is that emigration may be stimulated by economic adversity, resulting from rising unemployment, decreasing living standards and real incomes coupled with high inflation. Such factors, arising from the market reform, have encouraged people to search for better living conditions outside the region.

With the greater freedom to travel that are part of the post 1989 reforms, internal migration or emigration out of the region could have the most significant influence on population distribution in the immediate future. Two factors, one political, one economic, would underlie this. First, nationalist problems released with the political liberalization have encouraged ethnic and religious tension in East European states that in turn have contributed to conflict and oppression in certain areas. At present, the former Yugoslavia is the main source of such movement as the former federation's disintegration has resulted in a long and bitter civil war. Recent UN estimates suggest around 1.8 million displaced persons within the former Yugoslavia and over half a million refugees from outside the territory. The split between the Czech and Slovak Republics could also lead to large-scale population movement, especially within the half million strong Hungarian minority in the new Slovakian state. The second reason is that emigration may be stimulated by economic adversity, resulting from rising unemployment, decreasing living standards and real incomes coupled with high inflation. Such factors, arising from the market reform, have encouraged people to search for better living conditions outside the region.

ECONOMIC AND SPATIAL CHANGE: Since 1989, there has been a distinct transformation in the economies of Eastern Europe towards more market-oriented growth. This is likely to bring major changes to settlement systems through changes in the scale, nature and spatial distribution of economic activities. The settlement changes are likely to be most dramatic in the countries with the most radical economic change. This change consists of initially macro-economic stabilization and a broad internal and external liberalization programme for the economy, followed by the launching of privatization. This describes the former Czechoslovakia in early 1991 and Albania 1992-3 and Poland 1989-91 while recent economic changes in Hungary may also place it in this category. In others, such as Romania, the economic (and spatial) transformation is likely to be more gradual. There are also those areas where economic reform has been halted while war-related expenditures and disorganization of the economy caused by armed conflict have led to hyper-inflation; this group includes Bosnia/Hercegovina, the 'new' Yugoslavia and to some extent Croatia.

INTERNAL MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION: Internal migration has generally been from poorer to richer regions and from rural to urban areas. The scale of rural to urban migration in recent decades has been such that the number of people residing in rural areas fell in all but Albania. In the decade after 1965, more than half the increase in urban population was caused by rural to urban migration.

Within the region, all but Albania and parts of the former Yugoslavia have more than half their population in urban centres while in the Czech and Slovak Republics and in Bulgaria, more than two thirds live in urban centres. A significant part of the inter-regional migration trend pre-1989 was attributable to official government policies that promoted the growth of large towns and cities to provide the labour force for major plants and enterprises.

A very considerable proportion of the region's urban population lives in relatively small urban centres. In 1992, more than half the urban population lived in urban centres with less than 100,000 inhabitants and urban centres with 100,000 or more inhabitants contained a quarter of the region's population; for the European Union, by way of comparison, half the urban population live in cities of 100,000 or more inhabitants.

The proportion of the urban population living in cities with more than one million inhabitants also declined in most countries, due to the emphasis of communist planners on developing urban centres lower down the urban hierarchy. New town development has been popular - usually connected to one economic function such as a town to house the population of a coal mine. In some instances, strong controls were placed on the growth of the largest cities. For instance, in Hungary, Budapest became so popular that a political decision was taken to discourage people from living there.

It was noted already that many of the region's main population concentrations are around national capitals and major industrial centres. Upper Silesia near the Polish/Czech border is most characteristic of the industrial centres based on coal exploitation and this is the only industrial concentration similar in urban population density to those of Western Europe; in 1991, it had some 2.25 million inhabitants. Katowice county within which it is located covers just 2 percent of Poland's territory but with around 4 million inhabitants, it has some 10 percent of the national population. There are also the large metropolitan centres that include state capitals such as Warsaw and Bucharest (each with over 2 million inhabitants) and Prague, Zagreb and Bratislava and regional agglomerations such as Brno, Kracow, Pozna½, Lódz and Wroc"aw. Unlike Katowice, most of these have been important urban centres for centuries and were part of an integrated system of Central European manufacturing and trading cities, prior to the industrial revolution. For instance, Warsaw, Prague, Belgrade, Poznan, Budapest and Bucharest were among Europe's largest urban centres for parts of the late Middle Ages and/or 16th and 17th centuries.

There is considerable variation in the rate at which the region's major cities have grown in recent decades. Within the United Nations list of the million cities in the region shown in Table 2.15, Katowice appears as the largest and among the most rapidly growing in recent decades but this population of 3.5 million in 1990 refers to the country, not the town and Katowice County is perhaps better considered as a region rather than a city or metropolitan area. However, the Upper Silesian Industrial Region with around 2.25 million inhabitants in 1992 would be among three other metropolitan centres, each with over 2 million in 1990: Warsaw, Bucharest and Budapest.

_____________________________________________________

Table 2.15 also shows how Warsaw, Bucharest and Sofia have grown relatively rapidly since 1950 while Prague, Lodz and Gdansk have grown relatively slowly. Part of the reason for Warsaw's rapid growth since World War II has been the rebuilding of the city after most of it was destroyed by the Nazis; in addition, the communist policy of heavy industrial development attracted many rural to urban migrants while increased mechanization in agriculture lessened job opportunities in rural areas. Bucharest and Sofia grew rapidly as what were predominantly agricultural economies prior to World War II underwent rapid industrialization. Cities such as Prague, Budapest, Lodz and Gdansk were already established industrial centres prior to World War II; some experienced less war damage.

In considering population and urban change in this region, most attention is given to the period 1959 to 1989, with a particular interest in the period 1979-89, because 1959, 1969, 1979 and 1989 were census years in the former Soviet Union and the census data permit a more detailed consideration of such change. During this period, the region's population grew from 209 million to 287 million - with a population growth rate relatively low by world standards; it was slightly lower than the population growth rate of North America. Aggregate statistics for the whole region are much influenced by what is taking place in the Russian Federation; with 147 million inhabitants in 1989, it concentrated just over half of the region's population on more than three quarters of its territory. Ten of the fifteen republics had less than 8 million inhabitants on that date; four had less than 4 million.

Table 2.16 shows the diversity in population and urban change for these three decades between what were to become the independent republics. The most rapidly growing republics more than doubled

their population while the least rapidly growing had populations that increased by less than 30 percent. There are clear contrasts between the small increases among the Russian Federation, the Baltic States to the northwest and the western republics that border Europe that have low birth and death rates and the southern - especially Central Asian - republics that have high birth rates and low death rates. Among the other republics, population growth rates fell between these two extremes.

_____________________________________________________

This same geographic contrast is evident for levels of urbanization in 1989 and for the scale of increase in urbanization levels between 1959 and 1989. This same group of the Baltic States, the Russian Federation and the western republics bordering Europe are all among the most urbanized - all but Moldova had 65 percent or more of their populations in urban areas by 1989 - and were among the most rapidly urbanizing regions for this 30 year period. By contrast, the Central Asian republics are the least urbanized and urbanized much less rapidly - indeed in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, the level of urbanization did not increase in these 30 years. The other republics, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, generally fall within these extremes. This reflects the general geography of development within the former USSR. Urbanization levels across the four Central Asian republics remained static or fell during the decade 1979-89 as rural populations grow more rapidly than urban populations.

Within the Russian Federation, there was considerable diversity in the level of urbanization among the eleven economic regions. The most urbanized were the Central region (83 percent urban) with Moscow at its core and the Northwest (87 percent) with St. Petersburg at its core; the least urbanized were the three more agricultural regions located in central and southern parts of the European territory - for instance the North Caucasus (57 percent) and the Central Black Earth (60 percent).

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: There were major demographic changes in most parts of the region in the three decades up to 1989. Birth rates and rates of natural increase were high during the 1950s, partly as a result of the post war "baby boom" but both fell rapidly throughout the 1960s as the considerably reduced generation of wartime children entered its period of maximum fertility. An increased birth rate might have been expected in the 1970s when the larger post-war generation entered its twenties but this did not happen. A series of pro-natalist government measures sought to stimulate birth rates and may have contributed to a slight increase during the 1980s but by the end of the decade, birth rates were again in decline. Social and economic changes were important in helping explain such demographic change. Rising living standards and better health care combined with changing values help explain declining birth rates in the more wealthy republics. However, some of the negative consequences of Soviet-style development have also been cited as helping to reduce fertility levels across the region including shortages of accommodation, poor health (linked to such factors as alcoholism, smoking, industrial pollution and inadequate expenditure on health protection) and low levels of service provision in cities (particularly affecting women who assume the larger share of domestic work).

This general picture of low birth rates, death rates and rates of natural increase applies much less to the more rural and traditional Central Asian Republics. Although they also experienced a decline in birth rates during the 1960s, this decline began at a much higher level and also stopped at a higher level. While the average birth rate for the region in 1989 was 17.6 per 1000 population, it exceeded 30 in each of the Central Asian republic. Although Table 2.16 suggests that urban change is relatively slow in the four Central Asian Republics, because of high natural growth rates, the rate of population growth in urban areas during this 30 year period exceeded that of many of the rapidly urbanizing republics. It is a reminder of how rapidly city populations can grow without large in-migration flows, when rates of natural increase are high.

ECONOMIC AND URBAN CHANGE: Generalizations about urban change in this region are very difficult. First, there are an enormous number of urban centres - there were 6,216 urban centres in the 1989 census. Secondly, there is the great economic, social and demographic diversity among the fifteen republics - and indeed the diversity within the larger ones, especially the Russian Federation. Thirdly, there are the complex changes in national boundaries and in restrictions on international trade after the Second World War through which many major cities in the West lost economic and political importance - for instance Lvov and Riga. But throughout the Soviet period, there was a strong relationship between urban and industrial growth, and the Soviet leadership's industrial development policies had a major impact upon population and urban change. The post-Stalin leadership (after 1953) broadened the goals of its economic policies to emphasise agriculture, consumer goods and services, without any absolute downgrading of the Stalinist accent on heavy industry and the military sector. A priority to industrial modernization and to introducing the plastics and chemical products that characterize modern industrial economies meant investment in oil and natural gas production. This new emphasis required increased output by the Volga-Urals oil and gas field, conveniently located in European USSR. This helps explain why several of the region's most rapidly growing cities both for the period 1959-1979 and for the period 1979 to 1989 were in the Volga-Urals regions. And ultimately, as energy demands grew, this also meant drawing on the resources of various peripheral producers in the North, Siberia (especially West Siberia), Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

Patterns of urban growth during the 1980s still strongly reflect the industrial emphases of the post-Stalin years. Although the exploitation of oil and gas and other natural resources stimulated urban and industrial development in producing regions such as the Volga region and the southern part of Western Siberia, the growing network of oil and gas pipelines and electricity grids also permitted the continuing expansion of industrial output in the west, next to Europe where most of the population and industrial capacity were concentrated. Some industrial development was also stimulated in other territories that were further away but which had labour surpluses or other advantages - for instance Belarus', the Baltic Republics and the Transcaucasus. Two other reasons help explain why urban development remain concentrated in the west. The first was that it had numerous environmental and social advantages over the east and a much higher standard in infrastructure provision. The second was the increasing importance of trade links with East Europe (through COMECON) and West Europe, especially after 1970.

Priority was also given to modernizing and diversifying the metallurgic industries, including iron and steel industries, most of which were located in the European territories. The most important development in European USSR was the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly and its associated metallurgical and supporting industries, in the Central Black Earth economic region in Russia. Its metal-demanding branches continued to develop in such traditional heavy industry regions as the Urals and Donets-Dnepr ( Ukraine) but the less metal-intensive and often more skill-demanding industries were attracted to traditional engineering regions like those around Moscow, St. Petersburg and the Baltic capitals. Similarly the motor vehicle industry developed around Moscow and in the newly industrializing Volga region.

As in Europe and North America, the location of defence-related industries and other military activities was an important influence on urban change. These were particularly important to the economies of the Centre, the Urals and the Far East. Both Moscow and St. Petersburg have high concentrations of defence-related industry - especially St. Petersburg where by the late 1980s, around a quarter of the workforce were employed in the defence industry. Three of the other 13 "million cities" in the Russian Federation, Ekaterinburg, Perm and Chelyabinsk, were among the other cities with high concentrations of defence industries. A system of 'closed' towns also developed where military industry or research were concentrated whose existence was concealed.

_____________________________________________________

Many regions remained relatively untouched by the post-1953 industrial policies and their urban centres stagnated as a result. Others, such as parts of the Urals and the Donets-Dnepr with traditional iron and steel and heavy metallurgical industries or parts of the Centre with textile industries were too closely associated with Stalinist industrialization policies to benefit from the new economic directions. However, deindustrialization and the heavy unemployment associated with it were never features of the Soviet period, as many industries remained in production, long after the stage that they would have been deemed unprofitable in the West.

LARGE CITIES: Increasing proportion of the urban population living in large cities. By 1989, 61 percent of the region's urban population lived in cities with 100,000 or more inhabitants compared to 49 percent in 1959. This is much higher than in East Europe where only 46 percent of the urban population lived in cities with 100,000 plus inhabitants. By this date, 22 percent were living in "million" cities compared to 9 percent in 1959.

Although official Soviet policy advocated controlling the growth of large cities, the elaborate government system for controlling migration to such cities established from the 1930s was never particularly effective. It was based on a system of residence permits, controls on employment and land use plans. The policy from the 1950s to persuade industry and other employers to located in medium-size and small urban centres generally failed to counteract the attractions of the large cities. Most new or expanding enterprises located in larger cities. Large cities had an important role in the command economy for two reasons. First, they had the best quality infrastructure and skilled labour forces but also relatively low wages and other cost advantages that encouraged (or compelled) state and other enterprises to locate there. Unlike market economies, in the Soviet command economy, wage rates, taxes, the cost of land (or rent) and infrastructure costs were not necessarily higher in large and successful cities compared to smaller and less successful cities as they would be in West Europe or North America. Secondly, in a command economy, success depends as much on access to political and administrative decision-makers and government officials as economic performance and this enhanced the attraction of major administrative centres. Important ministries and enterprises wishing to locate in large cities had little difficulty in persuading local authorities to grant the necessary permissions (including resident permits) and/or persuading national party or government bodies to put pressure on local governments. This helps explain the increasing dominance of Union republic capitals and many regional administrative centres as they concentrated an increasing proportion of the urban population in their respective regions over the 1959-89 period.

An analysis of growth characteristics and socio-cultural development for the cities with 100,000 or more inhabitants for the 1970s permitted the 221 cities to be grouped into four types. The first was a small group of 28 cities characterized by restricted industry-related growth and significant socio-cultural development; this favoured group included major urban centres such as Moscow and Kiev with high living standards. Next came a dynamic group of 42 cities with significant growth and development. This group included many cities towards the western and southern edges of the county that benefitted from the post-Stalin policies of industrial modernization. The third group of 59 cities had significant growth but restricted socio-cultural development and included numerous resource centres and peripheral cities where rapid industrial growth, often under the aegis of only one or two dominant ministries was not matched by adequate provision of services. The fourth group of 92 cities had restricted growth and sociocultural development and these included the heavy industrial centres of the Stalinist era - for instance cities in the Donets-Dnepr region, the Urals and the Kuzbass coalfield.

This concentration of rapid urban development away from the old heavy industrial centres was also confirmed by a study of the fastest and slowest growing cities between 1979 and 1989. Of the 35 fastest growing cities 1979-89, only two are in the older industrial regions. Most of these fast growing cities are close to Europe in Belarus', the Southwest of the Ukraine and Moldova, along the Volga and Kama rivers (part at least due to the oil and chemical industries, part to new manufacturing enterprises) and in West Siberia, east of the Ural region where oil and gas development have given impetus to rapid city growth. The distribution of rapidly growing cities during 1959-1979 is fairly similar, and again with few such cities being located in the older industrial areas - although the cities to the west experienced less growth than in the 1980s. Of the 36 cities with the slowest population growth 1979-89 (including six with a net decline in population), two thirds are the Central Region of Russia, the Donbas coalfield (mainly in Donets-Dnieper) or the Kuznets Basin. Virtually all the slowest growing towns during 1959-1979 were also in or adjoining the mature industrial regions of the country.

By the 1970s, Soviet urban specialists became aware of a phenomenon that had previously been considered a characteristic of capitalism - the development of large urban agglomerations or clusters of functionally inter-related cities. The largest such agglomeration is the one with Moscow at its centre. There are also clusters of cities on the Donetsk mining centres, the Kuzbass coalfield (also known as the Kuznetsk basin), in the central Dnepr region, and the Urals group of metallurgic and mining cities. The development of such agglomerations or core regions highlighted the need for a more comprehensive system of land use planning working at a regional scale but until the end of the Soviet period, such a planning system had failed to emerge. Instead, systems of cities often developed because enterprises and agencies denied access to one city were able to choose a location in a neighbouring city. Similarly, many migrants unable to gain residence rights in one city found accommodation in another nearby and commuted into the city by train or bus. In many large cities, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, ten per cent or more of the labour force live outside their boundaries and commute. But unlike Europe and North America, it tends to be the poorer groups working in the less remunerative jobs and living in poor quality settlements that commute from "suburban" locations while the inhabitants in privileged central cities enjoyed superior living standards and services. Central city residents also enjoy subsidized public transport while commuters travel on non-subsidized transport.

From the 1950s, with the drive to solve the housing crisis, Soviet cities also expanded their physical size. Despite land use controls, land was not always used efficiently and the inhabitants of new housing estates often had lengthy journeys to work. However, Soviet cities generally spread less than cities in the West. One reason was the state control of land and of much of the housing and the emphasis in public housing on apartment blocks rather than individual units within relatively low density suburban developments. A second reason was low levels of car ownership and the lack of development for roads, especially beyond city limits. However, growing cities made increasing land and resource demands on their wider region through, for instance, recreational demands (including dachas or second homes and collective gardens) and the rising demand for fresh water and for land for rubbish disposal. These often threatened the integrity of green belts and other valued resources and gave rise to severe disputes between neighbouring local authorities.

RURAL SETTLEMENTS: Between 1959 and 1989, rural populations and the number of rural settlements declined in most regions. In the Russian Federation, the rural population declined by around a third and among its eleven economic regions, only those to the extreme east and the extreme south (North Caucasus) had population increases. The Ukraine, Belarus' and the three Baltic states also experienced declines in their rural population in this period. Most of the declines were the result of rural-urban migration and they left within many rural settlements the problems associated with an ageing population and labour scarcity. The number of rural settlements declined by more than half in this period to 332,000 in 1989. This particularly affected small settlements with less than 100 inhabitants that had housed 12.0 percent of the rural population in 1959 but only 4.6 percent in 1989. Such small settlements are characteristic of the landscapes of north Russia where the bleak natural environment restricts the opportunities for large villages to develop. The number of large rural settlements - those with over 1000 inhabitants - grew significantly in these three decades and they came to house 55.4 percent of the rural population. Larger settlements are especially characteristic of the semi-arid and arid southern parts of the region.

The rapid decline in the proportion of people living in rural areas reflects the priority given to urban-based production and the limited success in improving economic and social conditions in rural areas. But it is also linked to conditions and trends that pre-date the 1950s. Rural and agricultural work had long been poorly rewarded with relatively low wages compared to cities and very inadequate provision of services. The radical changes in the form of agricultural production under Stalin with the effective abolition of peasant farming and its replacement with a system of state or collective farms offered minimum incentives to the rural labour force. Although, after 1953, many efforts were made to improve wage levels in rural areas, to make agriculture more efficient and to provide services, these did not stem rural to urban migration. In addition, some of the rural improvement policies such as the grouping of rural inhabitants into key settlements where services could be provided more efficiently may have hastened rather than

slowed out-migration. Although the Soviet authorities also sought to control migration out of rural settlements by minimizing the issue of internal passports to collective and state farmers, this did not prove effective.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: Recent political changes and the fundamental changes they have included in economic policies will have far reaching implications for all aspects of population and urban change. Some of these had begun prior to the break up of the USSR in 1991. The reforms known as Perestroyka launched by the government of President Gorbachov sought to decentralize the command economy by introducing market-like elements and implementing measures of democratization. These helped provoke the break up of the USSR and since 1991, all the newly independent republics have been promoting a more market based economy (with varying degrees of enthusiasm) and many have moved towards some model of pluralist democracy.

Perhaps the most visible changes in settlement trends to date are the consequence of new political boundaries imposed across what was formerly a single political and economic space. One obvious change arises from each new republic having to reconstruct its independent political life around its capital city and inevitably, each capital city's significance will grow. A second change is the cutting of inter-republic linkages originally built up over many years to serve the interests of the Soviet command economy as a whole; when added onto market forces, these will have uncertain consequences for regional growth patterns. Transport routes are being reoriented - for example Russia's decision to build a new oil exporting port near St. Petersburg to replace Ventspils in Latvia. Several southern republics are seeking alternative routes for their export of fuels and other products. If trade with West Europe and other world regions expands - as seems likely - cities that are well located, close to international frontiers and transport routes are likely to benefit. For instance cities like Vyborn near St. Petersburg or Nakhodka and Vladivostok in the Russian Far East stand to benefit from their Special Economic Zone status. Cities in general may benefit from an expansion of service activity that was long held back by Soviet development patterns. Some of the settlements on the various resource frontiers may also grow as a result of expanded foreign investment and resource extraction and with an enhanced ability (compared to the Soviet period) to keep some of the income in the locality.

On the negative side, regions and cities closely associated with the heavy industrialization of the Soviet era - most notably Donets-Dnepr in southern Ukraine, the Urals and the Kuzbass in West Siberia may well experience the deindustrialization and outmigration that has already hit so many similar regions in Europe and North America. The "smokestack" industries were so widespread within the command economy that such processes will not be confined to a few regions and the effects are likely to be particularly devastating on "company towns" that were dependent on one or two heavy industries or on the exploitation of a natural resource that is no longer required. Such urban centres are found everywhere but especially in eastern regions. Similarly, policies to reduce military expenditure and to restructure the military-industrial complex will have serious consequences both in established industrial regions and in some peripheral ones where military activity and employment has been significant. Some of these changes may be ameliorated by government subsidies and regional policy but the scope for such measures is restricted.

At least up to 1994, the transition to a market economy has had rather limited effects on regional development and settlement. Government subsidy has staved off the worst ravages of unemployment and the command economy is only now in the process of privatization. Where subsidies have been removed or government commitment reduced, the effects can be considerable. Many northern regions of the Russian Federation have lost population since 1989 as a result of the closure or reduction of some resource extraction activities and military reductions. For example, Magadan administrative region in the extreme northeast of Siberia, where gold and some other mineral resources are exploited is reported to have lost 43 percent of its population between 1989 and 1994. Krasnoyarsk Territory in Siberia, also developed for its natural resources (timber, hydro-electric, minerals) lost 16 percent of its population in this same period.

There are also the changes in population distribution that arise from mass migrations by people escaping political persecution or actual violence. In many parts of the former USSR and especially in its Southern regions, the new political geography has precipitated disagreement, conflict and on occasion open warfare. One estimate for 1993 suggested that there were more than 2 million refugees and forced resettlers living in Russia. In the Transcaucasus, an exchange of populations of around half a million people accompanied the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Other regions have also produced large flows of refugees including parts of Georgia and the neighbouring North Caucasus and Tajikistan in Central Asia.

Finally, there are the changes taking place in rural settlements as state and collective farms are dismantled or restructured and land ownership or use privatized. Rural settlement patterns are likely to change in areas where agricultural production increasingly takes place within the private sector. For instance, the establishment of many new farms and small settlements linked to new market and agricultural service centres may replace the nucleated farm settlements of the large collectives.

But changes in the settlement (or urban) systems of the fifteen independent republics will depend much on the extent of their economic success. If the economic changes succeed in promoting a more widespread affluence, it may promote urban changes similar to those already described in West Europe and North America. The lifting of residence restrictions and of controls on migration suggests a much greater mobility than in the past. But there are large areas of the former Soviet Union that remained little changed by the post-1950s economic changes and have yet to be influenced greatly by the more recent economic and political changes.

NOTES AND REFERENCES; SECTION 2.4-2.5